

Children's comprehension and reference to mental states in language and social cognition
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It has been suggested that the recursive structure of complement-clause constructions supports children's understanding of False Belief (e.g., de Villiers, 2007). In the training studies that found correlations between children's understanding of complement clauses and False Belief, the main clauses contained a 3SG subject (*He thinks it's raining*) (e.g., Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003). However, children frequently hear and use complements with 1SG subjects in the main clause (*I think it's raining*) (Diessel, 2004). We conducted an experiment to investigate how German-speaking children's interpretation of complement clauses with 1SG and 3SG subjects in the main clause correlates with their False-Belief understanding.

1SG	3SG
Frog: I know, the sticker is in the red box. Cow: I believe, the sticker is in the blue box.	The frog knows, the sticker is in the red box. The cow believes, the sticker is in the blue box.

Only the children's performance in the 3SG condition showed a positive correlation with their understanding of False-Belief, suggesting that complement clauses with a 1SG subject in the main clause do not have the same meaning and/ or structure as complement clauses with a 3SG subject in the main clause. Only complement clauses with a 3SG subject in the main clause support the ability to represent other minds. We are currently running a follow-up study with English-speaking children and a greater variety of False-Belief measures.